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Recently, we came across a very well written and thoroughly 
researched article by Dharmananda and Firios entitled “Interpreting 
statutes and contracts: A distinction without a difference?”.1 The article 
made many excellent points and was very thought provoking – but it 
overlooked an aspect of legal interpretation which is central to the 
modern legal landscape, namely internationalisation.  In all areas of law – 
arguably, especially in our field of commercial regulation – the regulatory 
effects of globalisation and harmonisation necessitate a different 
perspective on both statutory and contractual interpretation.2  We do not 
disagree with the paper’s overarching conclusion that there are important 
parallels between contractual and legislative interpretation – but we posit 
that in the formula to establish this point it becomes increasingly 
important to include the international dimension. Not all domestic 
statues should be seen in a solely domestic light.  
The reason for this is not purely academic. Sadly, the phenomenon 
of overlooking this in scholarship and judicial application is very 
common, so the authors feel compelled to address this, and to 
emphasize the significance of the interpretive variations which are the 
result of the internationalisation of law.  
Model laws, legal transplants/legal diffusions and conventions have 
found their way into our legal system and form part of the Australian 
legal landscape. Importantly, many of the international documents 
include their own interpretive mandate and hence cannot be interpreted 
with the same tools as those who are entirely drafted by domestic 
legislators, thus creating a modern dualism of legal principles. Parliament 
is, in essence, the surrogate of the international diplomatic conference 
and hence Parliament’s supremacy is subrogated.3 As Corney put it, “The 
intent is to create an independent legal regime that transcends national boundaries and 
applies uniformly among state parties”.4 The conclusion is that a dual system 
of interpretative approaches exists in Australia in order to give internal 
legal effect to all laws currently in force in Australia. But shared 
international laws, in convention format or springing from Model Laws, 
do not come just from parliament but from a shared international comity 
                                                        
1 Jacinta Dharmananda and Leon Firios, ‘Interpreting Statutes and Contracts: A 
Distinction Without A Difference?’ (2015) 89(8) Australian Law Journal 580. 
2 Camilla Baasch Andersen, ‘A New Challenge For Commercial Practitioners: Making 
The Most Of Shared Laws And Their ‘Jurisconsultorium’’ (2015) 38(3) University of New 
South Wales Law Journal 911, 912. Here Andersen emphasises the necessity for 
commercial lawyers to consider the application of law in different contexts in order to 
keep up with the increasing trend of globalisation.  
3  Graham Corney, ‘Mutant Stare Decisis: The Interpretation of Statutes Which 
Incorporate International 
Treaties into Australian Law’ [1994] 18 University of Queensland Law Journal 50, 51. 
4 Ibid 50. 
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of states. Shared laws, like all things shared, have to be interpreted with 
an eye to how others are applying and interpreting them, so this cannot 
happen purely in domestic settings. This point has been raised in 
previous research on the global Jurisconsultorium of shared laws.5 
Applying such an angle to these unique forms of law would be to lend 
them a so-called “homeward trend” in interpretation, which frequently 
leads to non-uniform results6 and therefore inconsistency in application 
on the transnational scale for which these laws are designed. 
The frequency with which this added dimension of international 
interpretive aspects is overlooked in scholarship such as this is also 
mirrored in the legal profession and in the judiciary, which do not seem 
to appreciate the subtle differences in the interpretive mandate. 
Introspective and domestic interpretational guidelines become especially 
moot in the light of transnational conventions and Model Laws adopted 
into domestic legislation.  
In Australia, examples of shared laws built on model laws are many, 
both at State level (like the West Australian Commercial Arbitration Act, 
which like many other State acts in this field is an adoption of the 
UNICTRAL Model Law) and the Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 (Cth).7 
But we also see shared laws in the forms of implemented or adopted 
Conventions, such as the CISG. Hence in many statutes the authors' 
subjective intent is relevant such as in the CISG. Spiegelman – when 
defending the textual approach – did concede that “a business like” 
interpretation is an acceptable constraint on contractual interpretations.8 
This inclusion of shared international laws in the domestic legal 
framework truly challenges any view that “the interpretative task is an 
objective one”.9 The inclusion of model laws into domestic legislation 
further strengthens the international perspective of a less objective task.   
 
                                                        
5 Camilla Baasch Andersen, above n 2. 
6 Ibid 916. 
7 Commercial Arbitration Act 2012 (WA) based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration, GA Res 40/72, UN GAOR, 40th sess, 11th plen mtg 
(11 December 1985) amended in 2006 GA Res 61/33, UN GAOR, 6th Comm, 61st 
sess, 64th plen mtg, Agenda Item 77, UN Doc A/RES/61/33 (18 December 2006) and 
Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 (Cth) based on the Model Law on Cross‑Border Insolvency of 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, GA Res 52/158, UN GAOR, 6th 
Comm, 52nd Sess, 72nd plen mtg, Agenda Item 148, UN Doc A/RES/52/158 (30 
January 1998) annex I (‘Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law’). 
8 Hon James Spigelman, ‘From text to context; Contemporary Contractual 
Interpretation,’ (2007) 81 Australian Law Journal 322, 330. 




The starting point is the observation made by the House of Lords 
in Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines10 interpreting the Warsaw Convention. 
Lord Diplock rejected the plain meaning approach and stated: 
It should be interpreted, as Lord Wilberforce put it 
in James Buchanan & Co., Ltd v. Babco Forwarding & Shipping 
(U.K.) Ltd. [1978] A.C. 141, 152, unconstrained by technical 
rules of English law, or by English legal precedent, but on 
broad principles of general acceptation.11 
He went on to say that "the language […] has not been chosen by an 
English draftsman. It is neither couched in the conventional English legislative idiom 
nor designed to be construed exclusively by English judges."12 
Lord Scarman sums it all up when he states: 
Rules contained in an international convention are the 
outcome of an international conference; if, as in the present 
case, they operate within the field of private law, they will 
come under the consideration of foreign courts; and 
uniformity is the purpose to be served by most international 
conventions, and we know that unification of the rules 
relating to international air carriage is the object of the 
Warsaw Convention. It follows that our judges should be able 
to have recourse to the same aids to interpretation as their 
brother judges in the other contracting states, The mischief of 
any other view is illustrated by the instant case. To deny them 
this assistance would be a damaging blow to the unification of 
the rules which was the object of signing and then enacting 
the Convention. Moreover, the ability of our judges to fulfill 
the purpose of the enactment would be restricted, and the 
persuasive authority of their judgments in the jurisdictions of 
other contracting states would be diminished.13 
This paper will demonstrate that interpretive rules do not all the 
time depend on the domestic rules but depend on the interpretive 
mandate which is included in many model laws and conventions. Hence 
due care must be taken to follow the mandate and avoid an ethnocentric 
approach. It will be demonstrated that good faith and the subjective 
approach do play an important role and simply cannot be ignored. In 
addition, this paper will also argue that - depending on the subject matter 
- there is a difference between the rules of interpretation of statutes and 
contracts.  
                                                        
10 [1980] 2 All ER 696. 
11 Ibid 706. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid 715. 
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2. INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES AND CONTRACTS 
As Justice Kirby observed; the work of judges and lawyers involves 
the interpretation of statutes and contracts.14 Dharmananda and Firios 
note that Professor Carter said that “the time has been reached where reliance 
on cases interpreting statutes is rarely necessary or helpful when construing 
contracts.”15 On the other hand, Justice Kirby noted that there are: 
“differences between the way in which judges approach the construction of written 
contracts and the way that they approach the interpretation of legislation”16 It is 
argued that Justice Kirby’s astute observation is correct. There are two 
situations where the application of purely domestic law is disturbed. 
Hence we challenge the four broad propositions put forward by 
Dharmananda and Leon Firios; the objective approach that the text is 
paramount, that purpose and context inform the meaning of the text and 
that courts can fill gaps in the text, are not in every case applicable.17 A 
soon as transnational legal texts are to be interpreted, the propositions 
change, firstly in transplantations and secondly with model laws and 
conventions.  
The first situation is best explained by Kirby J in Air Link Pty Ltd v 
Paterson.18  The Civil Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1959 (Cth) in essence 
is nearly identical to the Warsaw Convention and hence is a transplant.  
Kirby J noted: 
In accordance with established principles of 
interpretation governing Australian legislation, designed to 
give effect to the language of international law to which 
Australia has subscribed, the expression in the Carriers’ Act 
must, if possible, be given the same interpretation as has been 
adopted by equivalent courts of other states parties. No 
differentiation could be drawn on the basis that it was not 
obligatory for Australia to apply the language of the Warsaw 
Convention to domestic carriage by air within Australia. 
Having elected to do so, it must be assumed that an 
interpretation consistent with any given to the treaty 
provisions should be adopted, in so far as the treaty language 
was borrowed.19  
Kirby J noted that to give effect to the language of the Warsaw 
convention, as it is enacted in the Carriers’ Act, the purposive approach 
                                                        
14 Hon Michael Kirby, “Towards a Grand Theory of Interpretation: The Case of 
Statutes and Contracts” (2003) 24(2) Statute Law Review 95. 
15 JW Carter, The Construction of Commercial Contracts (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2013) [1-
54]. 
16 Hon Michael Kirby, above n 14, 106. 
17 Jacinta Dharmananda and Leon Firios, above n 1, 581. 
18 [2005] HCA 39. 




must be taken by also relying on Lord Diplock’s statements in Fothergill v 
Monarch Airlines Ltd.20 Tellingly, Kirby J noted that the error of the Court 
of Appeal was  
In effect, the error of the Court of Appeal, in 
concluding otherwise, was the result of failing to give the 
language of s 34 a purposive construction. Particularly so 
when its origin, and operation, within the Warsaw 
Convention language is to be considered, in all of its differing 
applications in different countries by different decision-
makers.21 
In sum, it is argued that the interpretation of transplanted statutes 
is not only different from domestic statutory interpretation, but may also 
challenge the theory that it is essentially the same as interpreting 
contracts.  The interpretation of a statute is an essential element in the 
judging of a contract, but it will first require conflicts of laws analysis to 
ensure the correct contractually interpretive framework is applied.  
A far as model laws or conventions are concerned, the clearest 
distinction is supplied by the CISG which not only includes an article to 
interpret the convention but also how to interpret the contract. Article 7 
– interpreting the convention - notes: “(1) In the interpretation of this 
Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to 
promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international 
trade.”22 
The text of this article is clear; it talks about the interpretation of 
the convention and supplies two principles under which the CISG must 
be interpreted; namely to promote uniformity and the interpretation of 
any contract under the CISG must be guided by observing the principle 
of good faith. This interpretive rule is used in a number of UNCITRAL 
model laws and instruments, and not just the CISG, as an interpretive 
tool which assures uniform and international applications of law.23  
Both ahead of their time in 1980, Lord Diplock and Lord Scarman 
displayed their understanding of the principle of uniformity when 
commenting on the question of how a Convention must be interpreted. 
Specifically, Lord Diplock stated that an interpretation of international 
documents must be “unconstrained by technical rules of English law, or by 
                                                        
20 Ibid [78]-[79] (Kirby J). 
21 Ibid [84] (Kirby J). 
22 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, opened for 
signature 11 April 1980, 1489 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1988) (hereby 
referred to as the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods). 
23 See, for instance, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration (MAL) and its interpretive guideline. The success of this is analysed 
extensively in Dean Lewis, The Interpretation and Uniformity of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration (Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands Kluwer 
Law International, 2016). 
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English legal precedent.”24 The significance of article 7 of the CISG is 
demonstrated by the fact that it has found its way into many other 
conventions and model laws. As an example, the Cape Town 
Convention notes in article 5: “In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is 
to be had to its purposes as set forth in the preamble, to its international character and 
to the need to promote uniformity and predictability in its application.”25 
The Cross-Border Insolvency Act similarly notes in article 8: “In the 
interpretation of the present Law, regard is to be had to its international origin and to 
the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith.”26 
There is no doubt that many conventions and model laws 
incorporated an article setting out the interpretative requirements which 
do not involve ethnocentric considerations at all. Simply put, a court or 
legal practitioner must be aware of the application of good faith when 
required, but foremost, any interpretation of the text must be made 
“unconstrained by technical rules of [domestic law] or by [domestic] legal precedent.”27  
A further problem arises as several instruments are at the judge’s 
disposal when interpreting statutes which are international in character 
but  are not devised by domestic draftsman. Generally speaking, there is 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, specifically articles 31 
and 32;28 the statute specific interpretative article and the domestic law, 
such as the Acts Interpretation Act and the Parol Evidence rule. They all 
have a place within the interpretative landscape but must be used in a 
correct and appropriate manner. A good example to illustrate this point 
is the Cross-Border Insolvency Act. The court in Ackers and Others v Saad 
Investments Company Ltd and Another29 clearly demonstrates that there was a 
lack of understanding around the interpretative mandate. Rares J had to 
interpret an article within the model law and he correctly noted the 
importance of article 8; the interpretative article. The court did question 
if extrinsic material can be used to assist in the interpretation of 
ambiguities.30   
However, Rares J proceeded to rely on the Vienna Convention by 
noting “[it] is an authoritative statement of customary international law for the 
                                                        
24 Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines [1980] 2 All E.R. 696, 706. 
25 Convention On International Interests In Mobile Equipment, opened for signature 16 
November 2001, 2307 UNTS 285 (entered into force 1 March 2006) ch 24 available at 
http://dgca.nic.in/int_conv/Chap_XXIV.pdf.  
26 Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 (Cth) sch 1. 
27 Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines [1980] 2 All E.R. 696, 706. 
28 The application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to issues of private 
law instruments is debated by some, but see Bruno Zeller, Four-Corners - The Methodology 
for Interpretation and Application of the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Good (19 May 2003) CISG Database 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/4corners.html>.   





purposes of construing a convention.”31 Although this may be correct, the 
Model Law is not a convention. The Model Law has its own 
interpretative article and hence recourse to the Vienna Convention is not 
allowed. It must be noted that Rares J did arrive at the correct result as 
he did consult the travaux préparatoires.  Logan J in Tannenbaum v 
Tannenbaum32 incorrectly noted that: 
[…] even where an international convention or model 
law is adopted by Parliament in an Australian enactment, that 
enactment and the adopted convention or model law must be 
interpreted in accordance with Australian principles of 
statutory construction.33 
The point is that the model law must be interpreted using article 8. 
However, the domestically drafted part of the Cross-Border Insolvency Act 
indeed must be interpreted in accordance with Australian principles of 
statutory interpretation. Simply put, the Vienna Convention is not to be 
used, as it only deals with the interpretation of convention.34  
If we turn our attention to the CISG article 7, the matter is 
different. Again, the Convention must be interpreted using article 7. 
However, if article 7 should be interpreted – as it cannot interpret itself – 
recourse to the Vienna Convention will resolve the issue which will point to 
the use of travaux préparatoires. A comment must be made in relation to 
the Vienna Convention, specifically article 31.35 It describes the rule of 
interpretation of a treaty, which was put correctly by Corney as follows: 
The terms of article 31 indicate a moderate textualist 
approach with supplementary teleological assistance. It is not 
exclusively textualist in that it allows consideration of 
contemporaneous and subsequent related documentation as 
well as object and purpose. It has thus avoided the difficulties 
associated with an extreme plain meaning interpretation while 
at the same time properly emphasising the centrality of text.36 
In sum, the interpretation of statutes which contain model laws or 
are the result of the ratification of a Convention domestic interpretative 
tools have no place in determining the meaning of the statute. Professor 
Goode put it succinctly by stating: “The first point to note is that international 
interest [as defined by the Cape Town Convention] is the creature of the Convention 
                                                        
31 Ibid [295]. 
32 [2012] FCA 904. 
33 Ibid [37]. 
34 For further elaboration on this point see Bruno Zeller, ‘Statutory Interpretation – 
The Two Step Approach,’ (2014) 1 Curtin Law and Taxation Review 36. 
35 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art 31. 
36 Graham Corney, see above n 3, 60. 
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and in principle does not derive from or depend on national law.”37 It follows that 
applying the Cape Town Convention and any other convention for that 
matter by Australian Domestic law courts will by definition be subject to 
different interpretive tools. In essence, Justice Kirby was correct on this 
point, namely that the interpretation of statutes and contracts require 
different tools. Hence it is not possible to interpret transnational statues 
objectively as manifested by the words used in the document and not 
search for the actual or subjective intention of the author.38 The use of 
travaux préparatoires is an essential part of the interpretative process as 
applied by Kirby J in Air Link and Rares J in Ackers and Others v Saad 
Investments Company Ltd and Another.39 
3. INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS 
The first point to make is that the purpose of contract 
interpretation is to elicit evidence which supports a party’s arguments, to 
ascertain the true intention and to assess the parties' basis for the bargain 
struck. The issue again is; does the instrument, namely the statute, 
contain rules as to the interpretation of contracts? In common law based 
contract law, the common law has mandated that the parol evidence rule 
is to be applied if a term is ambiguous.40 However, under the CISG the 
situation is different. In addition to Article 7, Article 8 of the CISG 
states: 
(1) For the purposes of this Convention statements 
made by and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted 
according to his intent where the other party knew or could 
not have been unaware what that intent was. 
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, 
statements made by and other conduct of a party are to be 
interpreted according to the understanding that a reasonable 
person of the same kind as the other party would have had in 
the same circumstances. 
(3) In determining the intent of a party or the 
understanding a reasonable person would have had, due 
consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of 
the case including the negotiations, any practices which the 
                                                        
37 Roy Goode, ‘International Interests in Mobile Equipment: A Transnational Juridical 
Concept’ (2003) 15 Bond Law Review 9, 12. 
38 Jacinta Dharmananda and Leon Firios, above n 1, 581. 
39 Camilla Baasch Andersen, above n 2, 915. Professor Andersen mentions how the 
available travaux préparatoires of the CISG have expressed the need to interpret 
conventions with the ‘goal of uniformity’. 




parties have established between themselves, usages and any 
subsequent conduct of the parties.41 
As it can be seen, article 8 is structured in two ways, first the 
subjective approach is to be used and only if it does not yield any result 
will the court use the objective approach. In essence, the parol evidence 
rule is at odds with the contract interpretation of the CISG.42  The first 
question is; how do articles 7 and 8 interrelate? As indicated above, 
article 7 CISG is, in cases of uncertainties, interpreted with the aid of the 
Vienna Convention. However, article 8 is only subject to article 7. The 
debate is whether article 7 therefore also includes the interpretation of 
the conduct of the parties. There are two main views on this matter. First 
that article 7 does not inform on the conduct of the parties43 and the 
second view argues that at least impliedly the two articles are linked.44 
The reason is that article 7 mandates that good faith must be 
applied. Good faith is a general principle of the CISG and hence will also 
influence article 8. This mandate is explained in article 7(2) which states: 
(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this 
Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be 
settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is 
based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with 
the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private 
international law.45 
As the CISG is not a code, gaps - as noted in article 7(2) - must be 
filled by domestic law. Hence, a court must resort to domestic rules of 
interpretation on that issue only but must also be careful not to overstep 
“the mark”, as otherwise article 7 and 8 would be breached. However, 
the problem in Australia is not how the dual system coexists but the lack 
of understanding how article 8 influences the gathering of evidence to 
support claims form the parties in the dispute. A very good example is 
Fryer Holdings v Liaoning MEC Group.46 The question was whether the 
goods were fit for the purpose and what damages can be claimed. The 
court did mention article 35 CISG but neglected to consult article 74 in 
relation to damages. The problem was twofold, first article 7 was not 
                                                        
41 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art 8. 
42 See generally Bruno Zeller, ‘The Parol Evidence rule and the CISG – a Comparative 
Analysis’ (2003) 36 Comparative and International Law Journal of South Africa 308. 
43 See John Felemegas, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods: Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation (5 November 2002) CISG Database 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/felemegas.html>. 
44 See Bruno Zeller, Four-Corners – The Methodology for Interpretation and Application of the 
UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (19 May 2003) CISG Database 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/4corners.html>. 
45 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art 7(2). 
46 [2012] NSWSC 18. 
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consulted, otherwise the court would have realised that to rely on 
domestic jurisprudence and domestic law is wrong. In para 19 the court 
stated: 
Were the goods fit for purpose? The test which has 
been applied in this country is that fitness for purpose equates 
to being of merchantable quality. See, for example, Castel 
Electronics Pty Ltd v Toshiba Singapore Pte Ltd [2010] FCA 
1028 at [123]. It seems to me that I should follow that test, 
particularly since it has been applied in other common law 
jurisdictions.47 
To compound the error, the court noted in para 20: 
The test of merchantable quality requires that the goods 
should be in such an actual state that a buyer fully acquainted 
with both latent and patent defects within them, and not 
limited to their apparent condition, would buy them without 
abatement of the price that would be paid if they were in fact 
in reasonably sound order and condition. See Dixon J in 
Australian Knitting Mills Ltd v Grant [1933] HCA 35.48 
To start with the CISG, article 35 does not include merchantability 
and even then, the test applied by common law jurisdictions is not to be 
used pursuant to article 7. In his article on statutory interpretation 
involving international treaties, Corney argued correctly that: 
A particular English word used in an international 
convention may have a meaning different from the same 
word used in a domestic statute. It is not appropriate to apply 
prior domestic meaning to a word in a convention.49 
To put it differently, the mandate of “international character” and 
to “promote uniformity” has been interpreted by international 
jurisprudence as not reverting to domestic principles and jurisprudence 
but to consult international jurisprudence, which can be found on the 
CISG Pace website.50  The problem with Australian jurisprudence is the 
fact that most of the Australian decisions are not correct but via the 
principle of precedent the errors have persisted,51 as also evidenced by 
the Castel  case below.  
                                                        
47 Ibid [19]. 
48 Ibid [20]. 
49 Graham Corney, above n 3, 58 at fn 3. 
50 See Pace Law School Institute of International Commercial Law, Albert H. Kritzer 
Cisg Database, <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/> (last updated29 January 2016). 
51 Camilla Baasch Andersen, above n 2, 932; The point is made as to whether CISG 
cases heard in Australia often cite US cases either to pertain to the international 
character of the CISG pursuant to article 7. Otherwise, it may simply be the case of 




Reverting back to Castel Electronics Pty Ltd v Toshiba Singapore Pte 
Ltd,52 the argument by counsel in relation to damages indicates that the 
interpretive mandate has not been grasped, which is astonishing, as a 
simple reading of article 74 would already have alerted that the following 
stamtent is not correct. Counsel argued: 
Counsel argued Castel’s expectation of the profit to be 
derived by it from sales of each consignment of goods should 
have been ascertained objectively at the time of the 
“conclusion” of the sales contract related to that 
consignment.53 
Article 74 clearly notes that the 
party in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract, in the light of the facts 
and matters of which he then knew or ought to have known, 
as a possible consequence of the breach of contract. 
 This suggests that article 8 needs to be consulted and a cursory 
read would also lead to the conclusion that the phrase “knew or ought to 
have known” would at least suggest that either the subjective approach is 
to be used or an argument must be mounted that the subjective 
approach does not yield a result and hence the objective approach is to 
revert to article 8.  
Unlike the Australian courts, the New Zealand High Court have 
understood the interrelationship of the application of the CISG and 
hence the interpretative mandate. In RJ & AM Smallmon v. Transport Sales 
Limited and Grant Alan Miller54 French J noted that the CISG applies but 
that “counsel for both parties nevertheless sought to rely on domestic sale of goods law. 
However, in my view, recourse to domestic law is prohibited by Article 7”.55 French 
J went on to explain that: 
The requirement imposed by Article 7(1) namely to have 
regard ‘to the international character of the convention and to 
the need to promote uniformity in application’ is generally 
accepted as establishing what has been called a principle of 
autonomous interpretation. That means the Convention must 
be applied and interpreted exclusively on its own terms, 
having regard to the principles of the Convention and 
                                                                                                              
Commonwealth’ and whether this is just incidental in the pursuit of international 
uniformity. 
52 Source. 
53 Castel Electronics Pty Ltd v Toshiba Singapore Pte Ltd [2011] FCAFC 55, [202]. 
54 RJ & AM Smallmon v. Transport Sales Limited and Grant Alan Miller [2011] NZCA 340 
(30 July 2010). 
55 Ibid.  
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Convention-related decisions in overseas jurisdictions. 
Recourse to domestic case law is to be avoided.56 
The court also referred to academic writing57 and was right to 
correct counsel who attempted to justify the use of domestic law by 
referring to article 7(2). French J correctly stated that article 7(2) “only 
authorises reference to domestic law in order to fill gaps in interpretation”.58 As there 
is no gap, domestic law is not applicable and in applying article 35 the 
court relied on article 8.  
The case went on appeal to the Court of Appeal59 which dismissed 
the case. Of real interest is the fact that the court relied on academic 
writing and jurisprudence from many countries. It is indeed a model of 
how the CISG needs to be interpreted and applied. 
4. CONCLUSION 
This paper has demonstrated that the transnational interpretive 
mandate in general has not yet been understood in Australia; the 
prerequisite paradigm shift has not yet eventuated. The effects of relying 
on learned domestic principles in isolation is one which does not accord 
with harmonisation, uniform laws and the increasing role of 
internationalisation.  
An ethnocentric approach, or ‘homeward trend,’60 is far too 
prevalent. Despite a promising start, specifically in the area of the CISG, 
no judgement has been delivered where either counsel or the courts were 
aware and hence applied the correct interpretive tool.61  
The issue is that a convention does not only bind nations 
internationally, “it is also necessary for the treaty to have internal legal effect.”62 
This paper has also demonstrated that Corney was correct when already 
in 1994 made the observation that: 
                                                        
56 Ibid. 
57 Peter Schlechtriem, Requirements of Application and Sphere of Applicability of the 
CISG (2005) 36 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 781, 789-790.  
58 RJ & AM Smallmon v. Transport Sales Limited and Grant Alan Miller [2011] NZCA 340 
(30 July 2010). 
59 Ibid.  
60 Camilla Baasch Andersen, above n 2, 916. 
61 Ibid 931 as mentioned earlier, it is still uncertain whether the courts follow 
established CISG case law out of respect of following the tradition of commonwealth 
common law or whether there is truly the goal of uniform application of the 
convention in mind. Whatever the case, it is still too early to tell without further 
jurisprudence. Furthermore, with the availability of online databases such as the Pace 
Law School Institute of International Commercial Law, Albert H. Kritzer Cisg Database, 
available at < http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/> there is no need for practicing counsel 
or even courts to ignore the international jurisprudence and information they have at 
their fingertips at any given moment. 





The executive and legislative branches, having fulfilled their 
respective roles by concluding the treaty and enacting its terms, 
have signalled to the judiciary the need to restock its interpretative 
armoury to meet a hitherto seldom confronted challenge. If the 
judiciary fails to develop the means to interpret treaties, the 
attempt to create an international regime will flounder for want of 
a basic tenet: uniform application of uniform laws.63 
                                                        
63 Ibid 51. 
